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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, § 78-2-2 (3) (j) .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Must a "cure" of a default in a real

estate contract be in the form of a written agreement
or can the "cure" be accomplished by part performance
or by oral agreement?
Standard of Review: Whether a cure of a
default can be accomplished by part performance or by
oral agreement is a legal question of first impression
in Utah which is reviewed under a correction of error
standard, with no deference accorded to the trial court
determination. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater
Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Preserved for Appeal: The DeWitts preserved
the right to appeal by filing a Rule 52(b) motion to
amend findings and ruling granting a directed verdict
(R. 269).
2.

Issue: Should the directed verdict against the

DeWitts be vacated on the basis of estoppel and part
performance?
Standard of Review: Because this court is
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reviewing a case decided on a directed verdict, the
appellate court's standard of review is the same as
that imposed upon the trial court.

The evidence must

be examined in the light most favorable to the losing
party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n ex.
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc.,
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).
The appellate court should sustain the granting of
a motion for a directed verdict only if the evidence
was such that reasonable men could not arrive at a
different conclusion.

Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d

68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973).
Preserved for Appeal: The DeWitts preserved
the right to appeal by filing a Rule 52(b) motion to
amend findings and amend ruling granting a directed
verdict (R. 269).
3.

Issue: Does a lis pendens remain valid during the

pendency of an appeal?
Standard of Review: Whether a lis pendens
remains valid during the pendency of an appeal is a
question of law which is reviewed under a correction of
-2-

error standard, with no deference accorded to the trial
court's determination. United Park City Mines Co. v.
Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Preserved for Appeal: The DeWitts preserved
the right to appeal by filing a Rule 52(b) motion to
amend findings and amend ruling granting a directed
verdict (R. 269).
RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8:
Right to specific performance not affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements
in case of part performance thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(2):
Trust deeds - Default in performance of
obligations secured - Reinstatement
Cancellation of recorded notice of default.
(2) If the default is cured and the trust
deed reinstated in the manner provided in
Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his
assignee, shall, on demand of any person
having an interest in the trust property,
execute and deliver to him a request to the
trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver
a cancellation of the recorded notice of
default under such trust deed; and any
beneficiary under a trust deed, or his
assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after
such demand, refuses to request the trustee
to execute and deliver such cancellation is
liable to the person entitled to such request
for all damages resulting from such refusal.
A release and reconveyance given by the
trustee or beneficiary, or both, or the
-3-

execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a
cancellation of a notice of default.
Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded
notice of default under a trust deed is, when
acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is
sufficient if made and executed by the
trustee in substantially the following form:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The DeWitts purchased a home from Mr. Grossen

pursuant to a real estate purchase contract (R. 314).
The DeWitts fell behind on their payments, taxes, and
insurance, and Mr. Grossen recorded a notice of default
(R. 314). After the foreclosure sale was noticed up,
but before the sale occurred, the DeWitts' brother,
Ogden, met with Mr. Grossen regarding a cure of the
default on the property (R. 313).
Ogden DeWitt made the two payments to Mr.
Grossen, as agreed, for all back-due payments (R. 312).
Mr. Grossen accepted the checks without protest, but
did not cash them (R. 312). Then Mr. Grossen went
forward with the foreclosure sale (R. 312).
The DeWitts lost a home appraised at about $90,000
when the balance owing on the purchase contract was
about $35,000.

The trial court directed a verdict

against the DeWitts on the basis of the statute of
frauds (R. 311).
-4-

B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
This matter came to trial before the Honorable

Judge Schofield, of the Fourth District Court on March
20, 1997, and again on April 7, 1997. At the
conclusion of the DeWitt's case on the counterclaim,
Earl Grossen moved for a directed verdict on the
grounds that the oral agreement between Earl Grossen
and Ogden DeWitt, even if proved, was unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds (R. 220). On May 6, 1997,
the district court entered it Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, granting the directed verdict (R.
232).

On June 3, 1997, the DeWitts filed a Rule 52(b)

Motion to Amend Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a
Directed Verdict (R. 269). On September 5, 1997, the
trial court issued a ruling denying the defendants'
first Rule 52(b) Motion (R. 308). On September 25,
1997, the trial court entered its Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 315).
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

On June 1, 1993, Derel K. DeWitt and Afton H.

DeWitt executed a trust deed note and trust deed in
favor of Earl Grossen and Mary Ada Grossen (now
deceased)(R. 314).
2.

The note was secured by the trust deed and was
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recorded on June 2, 1993, against certain property
located at 30 North 100 West, Payson, Utah (R. 314).
3.

On September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as

successor trustee under the trust deed, executed a
notice of default and commenced non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings of the trust deed pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, § 57-1-19, et. seq.

The notice of

default set forth three defaults: 1) payment of the
note was delinquent in the amount of $1,011.32 as of
September 12, 1995; 2) property taxes to the property
were due and owing; 3) there was not adequate fire
insurance on the property (R. 314).
4.

On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden DeWitt,

the brother of Derel K. DeWitt and son of Afton H.
DeWitt, contacted Earl Grossen, the beneficiary under
the trust deed by telephone.

Earl Grossen and Ogden

Dewitt reached an agreement regarding the payment of
the arrearage which Earl Grossen stated was in the
amount of $1,617 and that taxes needed to be paid and
the property need to be insured (R. 313).
5.

Ogden DeWitt agreed to pay $1,617 in two

payments, one of $1,000 by the following Monday and one
of $617 paid by the end of the next week (R. 313).
6.

Ogden DeWitt tendered both the $1,000 and the

-6

$617 check to Earl Grossen as per their agreement (R.
312) .
7.

Earl Grossen accepted the checks without

protest, but, unknown to the DeWitts at the time, did
not cash them (R. 312).
8. Mr. Grossen admitted in the trial at least 19
times under oath that a deal had been struck with Ogden
DeWitt.

He specifically admitted, "I struck a deal

with him [Ogden DeWitt] that was verbal. . ."
(Transcript of bench trial, page 102, R. 504). See also
R. 471—"redemption or a deal to get the property
up-to-date"
R. 471—"precluded the deal from happening"
R. 471—"I struck a deal with him that was verbal"
R. 470—"Told him the deal was off several times"
R. 469—"the deal was off"
R. 4 69—"the verbal agreement was over'
R. 463—"no deal to proceed and I canceled it"
R. 462—"deal was off"
R. 458—"deal was totally off"
R. 458—"deal was off"
R. 447—"I canceled it" [the verbal agreement]
R. 441—"the deal was off"
R. 441—"we talked about a deal"
R. 439—"it [the agreement] was tentative in my
mind
R. 435"Told him the deal was off"
R. 435—"The tentative agreement—vegbe&ment"
R. 466—"Q. did you agree to accept those monetary
amounts as payments?" A. ". . . yes."
R. 447—"An agreement with . . . DeWitt"
R. 439—"this agreement you had with Ogden DeWitt"
9.

Similarly, Mr. Grossen admitted in his

deposition at least 20 times under oath that a deal had
been struck with Ogden DeWitt.
-7-

13-18—"the deal was off"
14-01—"I told him that there was no deal"
14-06—"the deal was that the back taxes weren't
paid"
14-15—"I told him the deal was off"
17-22—"I was at that time more willing to go
along with his proposal"
18-04—"the word of mouth deal, the deal we
discussed on the phone,"
18-06—Q. Okay. And that was regarding the cure
of the default on the property?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). And as I recall, those
amounts were for payments that they hadn't made
and late payments.
Q. So you had discussed amounts that—in coming
up with this deal, you had discussed amounts that
he would need to produce or give to you, tender to
you?
A. As I recall, yeah, that's what we talked
about.
Q. So the amounts of the checks that he had given
you were in the amounts that you agreed upon in
this deal?
A. Yeah, up to that time.
27-13—"the deal was off"
28-16—"I told him the deal was off"
31-18—"the verbal agreement" he had with Mr.
DeWitt. . .
32-24—"I agreed verbally."
35-06—"I told him that I had made a verbal
agreement with Mr. DeWitt and the deal was off"
39-06—"It was a verbal agreement"
39-17—"I think that there was a verbal agreement
to accept his check at the time"
39-21—"I think there was a verbal agreement"
40-15—"I agreed to wait"
41-19—"There was some kind of agreement obviously
because I accepted the check."
50-02—"the verbal agreement"
56-11—"I was not going to go through with the
verbal agreement that we had made over the phone"
56-21—"I had tentatively agreed verbally to allow
him to make part of the payments in the two
installments basically"
(Deposition of Earl L. Grossen Exhibit A) .
10.

On February 29, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., the

:

trustee for Earl Grossen held a trustee's sale at the
-8-

appointed time and place and no other bidders being
present, bid in the amount then due and owing under the
trust deed note. A trustee's deed was then executed by
David Crabtree, as successor trustee, conveying the
property to Earl Grossen (R. 312).
11.

Earl Grossen foreclosed on the property in

question when the DeWitts were current on the house
payments.
12.

Earl Grossen went forward with the

foreclosure sale on the basis that 1) he later
discovered an additional alleged default that he did
not know about when he struck the deal; and 2) the
taxes and insurance had not been paid (R. 312).
13.

On March 22, 1996, Earl Grossen served Afton

H. DeWitt and Derel K. DeWitt with a 5-day notice to
quit.

At the end of the five days the defendants

remained in possession of the property and on April 1,
1996, Earl Grossen filed an unlawful detainer action
against the DeWitts seeking to regain possession (R.
230) .
14.

On April 8, 1996, Afton H. DeWitt and Derel

K. DeWitt filed a counterclaim seeking to set aside the
trustee's sale on the grounds that Ogden DeWitt made a
binding contract with Earl Grossen which Grossen had
breached by failing to cancel the trustee's sale (R.
-9-

229) .
15.

Afton H. DeWitt and Derel K. DeWitt have

filed a lis pendens against the property (R. 229).
16.

At the conclusion of the hearing on the

counterclaim, Earl Grossen moved for a directed verdict
on the grounds that any oral agreement between Earl
Grossen and Ogden DeWitt, even if proved, was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds (R. 229).
17.

The DeWitts lost a home appraised at about

$90,000 when the balance owing on the purchase contract
was about $35,000 (R. 429).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Derel Dewitt and Afton Dewitt request this court
reverse the trial court's judgment against them
because:
(1) there is no law requiring that a "cure"
of a default be in writing;
(2) even if a "cure" of a default must be in
writing, the principles of estoppel and part
performance take this case outside the
statute of frauds; and
(3) a lis pendens remains valid during the
pendency of an appeal.
The DeWitts are aware of no Utah case that has
ever held that the statute of frauds bars enforcement
of a contract that has been partially or fully
performed especially when the party asserting the
-10-

statute of frauds has admitted under oath literally
dozens of times that the contract existed (See
Statement of Facts paragraphs nine and ten and Exhibit
A ) . The statute of frauds is meant to prevent fraud,
not perpetrate fraud.
When the court issued its directed verdict on the
statute of frauds, it did not have the benefit of
briefing on the Utah case law and the very unique Utah
statute that specifically allows for the partperformance (estoppel) exception to the statute of
frauds.
Mr. Grossen admitted under oath, "I struck a deal
with him [Ogden DeWitt] that was verbal."

(Transcript

of bench trial, page 102, R. 504). Hearing transcript,
page 3, line 23. At page 8, line 17 (R. 466) of the
hearing transcript, DeWitts' counsel asked:
Q.

And at the time of that conversation
around January 25, did you agree to
accept those monetary amounts as
payments?

A.

Based on the facts that I knew at that
time, yes.

In 18 other instances in the trial, Mr. Grossen
referred to the "deal" or "agreement" that he reached
with Mr. DeWitt and Mr. Grossen's subsequent
cancellation of that agreement.

Similarly, in Mr.

Grossen's deposition, he admitted at least an
-11-

additional 21 times, under oath, there was a "deal"
"regarding the cure of the default on the property."
Mr. Grossen even admitted to his attorney he "had made
a verbal agreement with Mr. DeWitt . . . " (Deposition
of Earl L. Grossen p. 35, 3-8, Appendix C)(See also
Appendix A identifying the 41 times Grossen admitted a
"deal" existed.)

Having repeatedly admitted the

existence of an "agreement" or a "deal," Utah law
estops Mr. Grossen from now hiding behind the statute
of frauds when his actions have led to the DeWitts'
performance of their part of the "deal."

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A
"CURE" OF A DEFAULT BE IN WRITING
Utah Code Annotated, § 25-5-1 is the statute of
frauds applicable to estates or interests in real
property.

The language of this section identifies the

types of real estate contracts that must be in writing:
(1) a contract that creates an "estate or interest" in
real property, other than a leasehold interest for a
term not exceeding one year; and (2) a contract that
creates a "trust or power over or concerning real
property."

Given this statutory criteria, it does not
-12-

appear that an agreement for the "cure" of a default
comes within the Utah statute of frauds. When Mr.
Grossen set the terms for the cure of the default, he
did not transfer an "estate or interest" in real
property.

The terms for the cure of the default set by

the plaintiff did not include any granting, assigning,
or surrendering of any "interest," "trust," or "power"
over the real property in question that would require a
"deed of conveyance in writing."
Utah Code Ann., § 57-1-31(1), addressing cures of
default, states that the trustor:
. . . may pay to the beneficiary or his
successor in interest the entire amount then
due under the terms of the trust deed other
than such portion of the principal as would
not then be due had no default occurred, and
thereby cure the default theretofore existing
and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore
had or instituted shall be dismissed or
discontinued and the obligation and trust
deed shall be reinstated and shall be and
remain in force and effect the same as if no
such acceleration had occurred. [Emphasis
added.]
Nothing in this subsection requires that a writing be
executed upon every cure of every default.

The

subsection provides that a cure occurs not when a
written agreement is entered into, but when there is
performance, i.e. payment.

When the trustor performs,

by paying, all foreclosure proceedings "shall be
dismissed or discontinued."

Historically and

-13-

practically, cures to default have not been required to
be in writing.

In the majority of the cases where a

default has occurred, the monies tendered to cure the
default are all that is provided.
is signed.

No written contract

Another example of how a cure for a default

would not be reduced to a written agreement is where a
breach has occurred because the trustor has failed to
maintain insurance or pay taxes on the property.

If

the trustor acquires insurance and provides the trustee
or lender evidence of that insurance coverage, or pays
the taxes, then a cure has been accomplished even
though there are no written documents which would
satisfy the statute of frauds. A separate written
agreement is never produced.
Utah Code Ann., § 57-1-31(2) goes on to state
that:
If the default is cured and the trust deed
reinstated in the manner provided in
subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his
assignee, shall, on demand of any person
having an interest in the trust property,
execute and deliver a cancellation of the
recorded notice of default under such trust
deed . . .
This subsection merely provides that the beneficiary of
a trust deed shall provide a writing i^f a person having
an interest in the property requests a written notice.
The statute also provides that a cancellation of a
-14-

notice of default under a trust deed is "entitled to be
recorded.'' But this statute does not state that a cure
must be in writing nor that a cure must be recorded to
be valid.

Juxtaposing subsection (2) with subsection

(1) makes it clear that a written cancellation is
purely optional.

The DeWitts are not aware of any Utah

law which, when applied to the undisputed facts of this
case, would require that the oral agreement to cure the
default be in writing.
Because this case was decided on a directed
verdict, the appellate court's standard of review is
the same as that imposed upon the trial court, it must
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Ass'n ex.
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc..
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

In the case at bar the

statutory and case law clearly support a judgment in
favor of the DeWitts, therefore, the directed verdict
should not be sustained.

Even if the court cannot find

that the facts and law clearly support a judgment in
favor of the DeWitts, reasonable [people] could arrive
-15-

at different conclusions and, therefore, the directed
verdict should not be sustained.

Anderson v. Gribble,

30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973).
POINT II.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A
SWORD TO PERPETRATE A FRAUD. THEREFORE, PART
PERFORMANCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT NORMALLY
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS CAN REMOVE IT
FROM THE STATUTE
The DeWitts believe the "deal" between Ogden
DeWitt and the plaintiff to cure the default does not
fall within the Utah statute of frauds.

But even if

this court were to hold otherwise, the doctrine of part
performance works to avoid the statute. As early as
1906, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that even a
verbal agreement that normally would lie within the
statute of frauds, if part-performed, can be enforced
by a court of equity.

Price v. Lloyd, 86 P.2d 7 67

(Utah 1906).
There is an abundance of Utah case law and other
authority which supports the notion that the doctrine
of part performance works to estop the assertion of the
statute of frauds.

In Jacobson v. Cox, 202 P.2d 714

(Utah 1949), the supreme court addressed the estoppel
issue in the context of real property.

The court said,

"We approach this question by directing attention to

-16-

the principle that the statute [of frauds] should be
used for the purpose of preventing fraud and not as a
shield by which fraud can be perpetrated.''

Id.

This

case is also relevant because, the contract was "silent
as to the time of payment."

The court then analyzed

the interaction between the principle of estoppel and
the statute of frauds as follows:
In 49 American Jurisprudence, Section 581,
the following principle in regard to estoppel
is set forth:
Closely allied to the principles of
protection against the assertion of the
statute of frauds to accomplish a fraud upon
the party who acted in reliance upon an oral
contract or the assertion of the statute as a
shield to protect fraud is the doctrine of
estoppel to assert the statute. It is
universally conceded that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked to preclude
a party to a contract from asserting the
unenforceability of a contract by reason of
the fact that it is not in writing as
required by the statute of frauds. As is
often said, the statute of frauds may be
rendered inoperative by an estoppel in pais.
Where one has acted to his detriment solely
in reliance on an oral agreement, an estoppel
may be raised to defeat the defense of the
statute of frauds. This is based upon the
principle established in equity, and applying
in every transaction where the statute is
invoked, that the statute of frauds, having
been enacted for the purpose of preventing
fraud, shall not be made the instrument of
shielding, protecting, or aiding the party
who relies upon it in the perpetration of a
fraud or in the consummation of a fraudulent
scheme. It is called into operation to
defeat what would be an unconscionable use of
the statute, and guards against the
utilization of the statute as means for
-17-

defrauding innocent persons who have been
induced or permitted to change their position in
reliance upon oral agreements within its
operation.
Id.
In Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah
1959), the court granted specific performance on the
ground that the terms of the contract were proved with
sufficient certainty by competent testimony.

The court

reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that the
court did not even refer to estoppel and simply phrased
the opinion in terms of the contract being "taken out"
of the statute of frauds by reason of ample part
performance by the plaintiff.
The court in, Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438
(Utah 1968), cited Utah Savings and Loan Association v.
Mecham, 366 P.2d 598 (Utah 1961), which sets forth the
requirements to establish estoppel against a mortgagee:
"in order to establish an estoppel against a mortgagee,
the lien claimant must show some concealment,
misrepresentation, act or declaration of the mortgagee
upon which the lien holder properly relied and by which
he was induced to act differently than he would
otherwise have acted."
Both the plaintiff and Ogden Dewitt testified at
trial regarding the terms of the contract.

Both

parties agreed that the $1,000 check and the $617 check
-18-

were in accordance with the terms of the agreement for
the cure of the default as set by Mr. Grossen.

The

acts done in performance of the contract were clear and
definite, and they were done in reliance on the
contract.

The DeWitts would not have paid money to

fulfill their part of the agreement in reliance on the
plaintiff's terms for the cure had there not been an
agreement.

Persons in the defendants' position would

not have paid money on a property that was going to be
foreclosed unless they believed they had an agreement
to cure the default.
There are many other cases which also support the
DeWitt's position.

Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d

708 (Utah 1977), is one of them.

One of the parties to

the action asserted the statute of frauds as a defense
to an oral contract involving real estate.

The court

found that there was "substantial evidence of a fullyexecuted oral contract of purchase.'' The court noted
that in reliance on one party's conduct, all other
parties bound themselves to sell and thus gave up a
substantial legal right.

The court stated:

These facts clearly meet the test of
equitable estoppel set forth in Koch v. J.C.
Penney Co., [534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975),] which
is: conduct by one party which leads another
party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course
of action resulting in detriment or damage if
the first party is permitted to repudiate his
-19-

conduct.
Id.

The facts of the case at bar also clearly meet the

test of equitable estoppel.
Again in Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, 611
P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), the court allowed the doctrine of
part performance to estop the assertion of the statute
of frauds:
The jury was instructed that if they found an
oral contract for the conveyance of the land
in question, the contract could be enforced
if there was sufficient part performance on
the part of plaintiff or if defendants had
acted in such a manner as to be estopped from
asserting the statute of frauds.
Id.
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals in, Green
v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), said:
". . . under the equitable doctrine of part performance
a court will sometimes apply estoppel to enforce an
oral or implied agreement which has been partially or
fully performed in reliance on the agreement."

In

another case, the court of appeals noted that estoppel
is an exception to the general rule that extensions of
a contract required to be in writing must comply with
the statute of frauds to be enforceable. Mills v.
Brody, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Finally, a law review article, The Doctrine of
Part Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in
-20-

Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 106 (1964), states: "An admission
by the defendant is, of course, the best parol proof"
of the existence of an oral agreement which could then
be enforced.

The article concludes:

Most jurisdictions do not have an express
part performance clause in their Statute of
Frauds, and thus, as a practical matter, it
would be difficult for courts in those
jurisdictions to formulate a highly-liberal
part performance doctrine. However, the
presence of an express part performance
clause in Utah's Statute would seem to give
legislative sanction to our court to adopt a
more liberal doctrine which would exclude
certain oral land contracts from the Statute,
on the same basis that oral contracts for the
sale of goods have been excluded.
In the case at hand both the plaintiff and Ogden
Dewitt testified at trial regarding the terms of the
contract.

While there was some disagreement regarding

the timing for the payment of taxes and insurance, both
parties agreed that the $1,000 check and the $617 check
were in accordance with the terms of the agreement for
the cure of the default as set by Mr. Grossen.

The

acts done in performance of the contract were clear and
definite, and they were done in reliance on the
contract.

The DeWitts would not have paid money to

fulfill their part of the agreement in reliance on the
plaintiff's terms for the cure had there not been an
agreement.

Persons in the defendants' position would

not have paid money on a property that was going to be
-21-

foreclosed unless they believed they had an agreement
to cure the default. Allowing the plaintiff to prevail
based upon the statute of frauds would work a fraud
against the DeWitts who relied on the plaintiff's
representations and performed according to the
agreement.
Earl Grossen has repeatedly admitted that an oral
agreement was struck and that Ogden DeWitt's actions in
paying the checks to the plaintiff were in accordance
with that agreement.

In Brinton v. Van Cott, 33 P.2d

218 (Utah 1893), the court stated: "Crucially
significant [to the estoppel analysis] was the fact
that the existence of the contract had been admitted as
true."
In The Bowery Savings Bank v. Jenkins, 516 P.2d
178 (Utah 1973), the Utah Supreme Court indicated tht a
party could waive the right to foreclosure by telling a
mortgagor that, "No action would be forthcoming if
defendant paid the aggregate of the payments due."
That is essentially what happened in this case. Mr.
Grossen told Ogden DeWitt that making the back payments
would prevent the foreclosure and Ogden DeWitt relied
on that promise and made the payments as promised.
Despite that, Mr. Grossen went forward with the
foreclosure sale.

The court in Jenkins referred to
-22-

these actions as "confidential double-talk . . . which
an equity court may abhor, but which a Scroogian
mortgagee might adore."

The Utah Supreme court has

also clearly stated that, "The principles of waiver and
estoppel have application in determining the rights of
parties to foreclosure sales." American Falls Canal
Securities Co. v. American Savings and Loan, 775 P.2d
412 (Utah 1989).
Of all the cases that have been cited by the
DeWitts holding that part performance and equitable
estoppel are sufficient to take transactions like this
out the statute of frauds, Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d
1035 (Utah 1975), is perhaps the most on point.

In

that case the court said:
There is no serious dispute that the parties
entered into an oral agreement, . . . there is a
factual disagreement as to the precise terms
concerning the down payment. The oral contract
was sufficiently definite; there was merely a
controversy concerning one of the terms of the
agreement, and it was the responsibility of the
trial court to determine which version was in fact
correct.
Even though the trial "court concluded as a matter of
law that plaintiffs had failed to establish the
material terms of an oral contract of sale," the
supreme court reversed stating that, "the evidence
clearly preponderates against such a finding."
-23-

The

court went on to conclude that the oral contract would
be enforced even though there was some ambiguity as to
certain material terms of the contract.

In the case

under consideration there is ambiguity as to the timing
of payments on insurance and taxes but both parties
agree that there was an agreement about the back
payments.
In this case, there is no dispute that a contract
existed and that the terms of the contract were
partially performed by the defendants.

The defendants

have shown that they were able to comply with the terms
of the agreement.

Therefore, in light of the DeWitts'

performance the court should find that the plaintiff is
estopped from claiming the statute of frauds as a
defense and the directed verdict should be reversed
because there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and
law that supports a judgment in favor of the DeWitts.
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Assfn ex.
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc..
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

The Court should not

sustain the directed verdict because reasonable
[people] could arrive at different conclusions.
Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432
(1973).

-24-

THE FORECLOSURE SALE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
BECAUSE THE DEWITT'S TENDERED THE MONEY TO
CURE THE DEFAULT
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-30(1) allows a trustor to
cure a default by paying to the beneficiary the entire
amount then due under the terms of the trust deed
within three months of the filing of notice of default.
This was accomplished in this case when Ogden DeWitt
tendered the two checks that Mr. Grossen had
represented would cure the default.

Utah Code Ann. §

57-1-31(1) also provides that once the default has been
cured, "all proceedings theretofore had or instituted
shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation
and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and
remain in force and effect the same as if no such
acceleration had occurred."

The Utah Court of Appeals

has interpreted this section to mean that, "the parties
are returned to their former status as if the default
had never occurred.

If a trustor subsequently defaults

again the beneficiary must begin new foreclosure
proceedings.

It may not rely on the previous notice of

default and declaration of acceleration."

Progressive

Acquisition, Inc., v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) .
The foreclosure sale should be set aside in this

-25-

case because Ogden DeWitt cured the first default.

He

tendered the money that Mr. Grossen represented was
required to cure the default, and Mr. Grossen accepted
both checks without protest.

These actions worked to

cure the default. Any subsequent "default" that Mr.
Grossen may had discovered after the checks were
tendered required a new foreclosure proceeding.
According to the relevant statutes and case law it was
improper for Mr. Grossen to continue with the original
proceeding after the cure; therefore, the foreclosure
should be set aside.
GROSSEN'S RELIANCE ON McKINNON IS MISPLACED
Mr. Grossen at the trial level relied on McKinnon
v. Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974), as primary
authority for his position that estoppel and part
performance do not apply in this case.

Grossen's

reliance on McKinnon is badly misplaced for four
reasons.

First of all, in that case "the defendant

denied the existence of any agreement, written or oral
1 . ."

That case is in stark contrast to the case at

hand wherein Mr. Grossen has admitted many times that a
contract or an agreement was reached.
Second, in McKinnon even the plaintiff's counsel
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conceded that the basic terms of the agreement were not
to be determined until some future date, and in fact
plaintiff's counsel "never proposed specific terms."
Once again this is in stark contrast to the case at
hand wherein both parties have recited exactly what the
specific terms of the agreement were, subject only to
dispute as to when the taxes and insurance had to be
paid.
Third, in McKinnon the party claiming part
performance stated in his deposition that, "these
checks were a cash donation" to the church and,
therefore, the court could easily find that the part
performance was not "exclusively referable" to the
agreement, as required by Utah law.

Once again that is

in stark contrast to this case wherein Ogden DeWitt
paid Mr. Grossen in excess of $1,600 solely because of
the agreement that was reached.

There was only one

reason Ogden DeWitt paid Mr. Grossen the two checks:
that was because they had reached an agreement for the
cure of the default.
Fourth, as Justice Crockett noted in his
concurrence, "the plaintiff could show no damage
because he sold his property without any lessening of
the price due to lack of the easement."

That is not

the same as this case wherein the DeWitts have
-27-

significant damage because they have been ousted from
their home, not to mention the trauma caused by
uprooting a family.

Therefore, the DeWitts believe

McKinnon is not controlling in this case and, in fact,
highlights the very points that make estoppel and part
performance very applicable to the case at bar.

The

DeWitts are aware of no Utah case wherein both parties
have admitted the contract existed, admitted the terms
of the contract, admitted part performance of the
contract, only to have the court then defeat the
contract on the basis of statute of frauds.
just the opposite occurs.

In fact

"The foremost element is

clear and convincing proof of the terms of the oral
agreement. An admission by the defendant is, of
course, the best proof (The Doctrine of Part
Performance, L. Rev. 106.)
POINT IIII
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS "RECOGNIZED THE
FULL EFFECTIVENESS OF LIS PENDENS PENDING
APPEAL"
In Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills,
590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that the fact that the lis pendens statute, Utah
Code Ann., § 78-40-2, "allows the recordation of a Lis
Pendens at any time clearly preserves its integrity
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after judgment and pending appeal." The court went on
to note, "this court has long ago recognized the ongoing potency and effectiveness of a recorded lis
pendens after judgment."

Id.

Finally the court stated

that, "the Court has already recognized the full
effectiveness of lis pendens pending appeal."

Id.

See

also California-Hawaii Development, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 365 (Ct. App. 1980).

This case

clearly establishes that the lis pendens should not
have been released by the trial judge and should be
reinstated by this court.
CONCLUSION
Because this is a directed verdict, the evidence
must be examined in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.
Management Comm. Of Graystone Pine Homeowners Assfn ex.
rel. Owners of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc..
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

Furthermore, it is

appropriate for the appellate court to sustain the
granting of a motion for a directed verdict only if the
evidence was such that reasonable [people] could not
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arrive at a different conclusion.
513 P.2d 432 (1973).

Anderson v. Gribble,

In light of this standard of

review the DeWitts respectfully request this court to
reverse the previously directed verdict for two
reasons.

First, a cure of a default need not be

memorialized in writing to be enforceable.

A cure can

be accomplished by performance or other resolution of
the matters constituting the default.

Second, the

directed verdict should be reversed because the
plaintiff admitted there was a "deal" and the DeWitts
performed at least part of that deal.

Therefore, the

doctrines of estoppel and part performance take this
case outside the strict application of the statute of
frauds.

Lastly, the DeWitts ask the Court to set aside

the foreclosure sale and to strike the portion of the
findings declaring the lis pendens released.

The lis

pendens should remain valid until this case is finally
resolved.
DATED this

?

day of

(Xy^g-

1998.

DUVAL HJttJSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.

(^GpftUbN W. DUVAL^
//
Attorney for Appellants
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Q And on that occasion, could you explain what
happened, how the default was cured or A The details of this are in these papers.
Q Okay.
A And there's a promissory note there signed
by Afton Dewitt and Derrick Dewitt and I think it's
dated November -- the 12th day of December, 1992. There
may be one later than that. Yeah, there's one later,
June 1993, the 1st of June, 1993, and that's signed by
both parties.
Q Do you mind if Ms. Petersen takes a look at
these documents? And by any chance, did you bring any
checks with you?
A I destroyed them. They weren't any good to
me because he had lied to me.
Q When did you destroy those checks?
A And misled me. After I got through telling
him on the phone that the deal was off Q Do you know A — for chicanery.
Q Do you know what date that was?
A Probably March or April of this year.
Something like that. I can't recall.
Q And when you say that the deal was off, what
are you referring to 0

1

25

Q Are you referring to Kevin Dewitt?
A Or Kevin, yeah. Derrick had it first and
then Kevin.
Q Okay. Let's go back to the checks that
you're referring to. You said that you received a check
for SI,000?
A As I recall it was about a thousand.
Q Do you recall the date that you received
that check?
A I think it was February. Somewhere around
in there, February or March.
Q So you think that would have been at the end
of February, or at the beginning of February?
A It seems like it was towards the end of
February. I tore the checks up and threw them away.
They were no good to me.
Q Did you receive that — did you receive that
check or any checks prior to the trustee's sale?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall the date of the trustee's
sale?
A I think it was April 1996. I think we have
that date. And it was advertised and Dewitts were aware
of it. And incidentally, they didn't show up for the
sale.
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Q Who did show up for the sale?
A Mr. Crabtree, my attorney at the time.
Q So Mr. Crabtree was the attorney that
conducted the sale?
A David Crabtree, right. And there's a copy
of the sale.
Q Do you know who Scott Ryther is?
A I don't have a clue.
Q Okay. So you destroyed the checks that you
received; is that true0
A And I told you why.
Q Do you know how Mr. Ogden Dewitt arrived at
the figures that the checks were written out for?
A As I recall, he came to those totals that
the checks were written for to make up for back payments
that had not been paid on the property. And there were
a whole bunch of payments since then that weren't made.
Q Did it include any other fees or charges?
A Not that I can recall. I don't think it
did. And if it did, it wasn't made clear.
Q And so you stated earlier that as of
December, you believe that it was seven or eight months
in arrearage, the property?
A I don't remember exactly how many months, I
would have to go back and calculate. I don't know
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1
A I told him that there was no deal, that I
2 wasn't going to take the checks and cash them. And I
3 didn't, 1 didn't cash any of them.
4
Q Is the deal referring to his having tendered
5 those checks to you —
6 i\
A The deal was that the back taxes weren't
7 paid as they should have been, according to the
JjA contract, and the house had been put under a lien of
9 '22,000, which I was very irate about, and the property
I (4) had been transferred to Mr. Ogden Dewitt without my
II knowledge, without my information,. My attorney had to
12 do research on that. David Crabtree, and he has the
13 David Crabtree file. Mr. Cline. And I was very irate,
14 to put it mildly, about what was going on so I told him
15 the deal was off, and he knows that.
16
Q And, again, do you have an approximate date
17 that would have been0
18
A That he gave me the last check, I think it
19 was in April or March of this year.
20
Q When you say last check, that's referring
21 t o 22
A He gave me one I think for 1,000 and another
23 one for 1,600 and something. And those were the back
24 payments of Derrick Dewitt's rent payments or house
25 payments that weren't paid.
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exactly how many months, but apparently it was in
arrears to the tune of about 2,600, because that's wha4
he paid me.
Q How did you receive the first check, was it
by mail or —
A The very first check?
Q Yes. Was it in person, was it —
(\ I think he dropped it off in person.
Q To your home?
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q How did you receive the second check?
\ I think he put it in my mailbox.
Q Do you I'm sony , w ith 11 children I
don't know that I caught every name on there. Do % ou
have a son named Alan?
A Never heard of him.
No son-in-law or
A Never heard of him. Don't know him.
Q Okay. Let's see. Why did you accept that
first check from him in person when he dropped it i-fP
\ Because I thought everything had been taken
care of and I had been led to believe that and I was it
that time willing to go along with his proposal. And
then I found out all these other things that made me
very upset and irate, to say the least.
Page 18

the advertisements. It was advertised for three \ .
THF WITNESS: Do you remember when the in:>t

(j When you say everything was taken care oi
his proposal, you're referring to the deal that you
referred to earlier'1
A The word-of-mouth deal, the deal we
discussed on the phone.
Q Okay. And that was regarding the cure of
the default on the property?
A Uh-huh (affirmative). And as 1 recall,
those amounts were for payments that they hadn't made
and late payments.
Q So you had discussed amounts that — in
coming up with this deal, you had discussed amounts that
— 'MHia: need to produce or gwr to >ou. tender to you?
A A- i recall. \eah, thai N what we talked
anou:
16
V v. Mie amounts oi" the checks that ne nad
I" giver \ou v*ere in the amounts that \ou had agreed upon
IN *n this deal^
iv
A Yeah u.
time.
20
Q Oka\
21
A But tnat was before I knew the facts of the
22 matter.
23
24
25

yyo
-age \V

Q Do you know when the property was posted
with the notice of sale?
A I think Mr. Cline has 'that information and

Capitol Reporters - ( 8 0 1 ) 363-7939
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VK CLINE: If you don't know the answer,
h i \ spot -late, just say I don't know.
MR. GUZMAN: Okay.
THE WITNESS: I don't MH-W
MR. GUZMAN: And do you ha\e J i'ii[i\

Il III

t,v!

' i' H*M have one,
MR. CLINE: We can produce those for you
MR. GUZMAN; Okay, great, thanks, I
•ipprcciate that.
• H \lf Guzman) Who prepared the notice of
> MI crabtree.
,) Okay. And wh .H , ,
v Mr. Crabtree.
[ >• . ou know how it was done'?
A It was advertised in the newspaper for three
weeks, from what he told me.
Q And at the home, d<• \, . l •<
lon't have a clue
Q Okay. V\rhen did you purchase this prope:
*• : ason?
\ I think about 1981.
P.-v^e ^°
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. ).• . uu recall how much you paid for the
property'
A No, I don't.
Q Would you be able to find that out?
. would like to speak to my attorney about
that one
Q Okay. And we will be taking a break, if you
A/ant to wait.
MR. CLrNE: Let's just ~ he doesn't recall
MOW much he paid for it. If you wan: u> make a written
request, then we can object to that. I don't believe
that's relevant, but I believe that issue has been
handled.
MR. GUZMAN: Okay.
Q (By Mr. Guzman) Do you know what the
property is valued at now?
A It was appraised for 90,000.
, i")< MM have a eopv of that appraisal with

19
20
21
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A I do not have it with me.
Q Would we be able to get a t np\ m il'uii
appraisal?
vould have to visit with my attorney about

24
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where you have actually taken out a second mortgage on
1
your property, have you ever requested from a first
2
mortgage holder, someone who was first in line on your
I 3
property, for permission to take out that second
4
mortgage?
5
A I don't recall any situation where I needed
6
to do that.
7
Q Could I ask then why you felt that it needed
8
to be done in this case?
9
A Why I objected to the second mortgage?
10
Q Why would you ~ why would you state that
11
one of the reasons for your objection of your — one of
12
the reasons that you did not want to go through with the
13
deal that you had with Mr. Dewitt was because he had
14
taken out a second mortgage on the home?
15
A I didn't want any encumbrances on the
16
property because I was in first position and it would
17
mean that if someone were in second position they would
18
probably bid against me on the property or I would have
19
to buy them out, which was suggested on several
20
occasions by Transamerica. Now why they didn't show for 21
the sale, I don't know. But they suggested on more than
22
one occasion to me that they buy me out, my first
23
position. That's why.
24
Q You stated earlier that you had received and
25

1
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i accepted late payments before from the Dewitts on this 1
2 trust deed note; is that correct?
2
3
A Yeah, on several occasions. More often than
3
4 not.
! 4
5
Q How did you handle those late payments? Did
5
6 you contact them and tell them that they were late ~
6
A If they had a phone where they could be
7
s found or if they would answer the door, which in a lot
8
9 of cases they were unavailable for comment, I had to
9
io track them down.
10
ii
Q How did they 11
iA Or go out to Pason to find them, and they
12
13 would never answer the door.
13
14
Q How did they tender the payments to you
14
15 generally?
15
1n
A Most of the time by check.
16
1
Q Was that by mail, or did they personally
17
h*> bring it by?
18
1g
\ I would say in a number of cases they would
19
\2u deliver the payment to my house or I would meet them 20
p i haltway between Pason and Orem, in Springville.
21
hQ When you say house, you're talking about
22
23
|23 your Orem home?
24
24
J
A That's correct.
25
I25
Q Were you present at the trustee's sale?
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A No.
Q And at what point in time did you decide to
proceed with the trust sale? WTien I say what point it
time, I realize we're talking about from December on,
December 1995, January 1996, et cetera.
A Well, I had talked about it on several
occasions with Mr. Buckley. I had located in Salt
Lake — relocated in Salt Lake and I was desirous of
changing the attorney because I was living in Salt
Lake. I knew Mr. Crabtree and I talked to him about il
and I think we proceeded on it in short matter after time after I talked with him about not accepting his
checks and that the deal was off.
Q Could you give me an approximate time frame
there?
A I think it was in the first part of March,
somewhere along in there.
Q Did you discuss this trustee's sale with any
of your children or family members?
A I don't remember.
Q Any other person besides your attorney?
A I don't think so.
Q And I think we clarified that Mr. Crabtree
was your attorney up until the time of the sale, is that
correct, from December or January 19 - let's say
Page 2!
January 1996 through the time of the sale; is that
correct?
A Approximately. And then he had some other
affairs to take care of in Washington, D C , some
weightier matters, and suggested that Mr. Wilkey
takeover for him in the law office, Kimball, Parr.
Mr. Wilkey moved to Arizona, so he's no longer handling
it.
Q Did your attorney, Mr. Crabtree, did he
notify you of any phone calls that were received by him
from Ogden Dewitt?
A Yeah, he told me that Mr. Dewitt had called
and wanted to redeem the property somehow. And I told
him it was impossible. I've pursued this whole story
line for, I don't know how long, and I told him the deal
was off and I told him why.
Q And this was prior to the sale, the
trustee's sale?
A That I told Mr. Dewitt that the sale was
off - the redemption was off?
Q I'm sorry. I wasn't being very clear and I
apologize for that. My question is did your attorney,
Mr. Crabtree, notify you of any phone calls from
Mr. Dewitt prior to the trustee's sale?
A Yeah, I think so. I think there was at
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least a couple of times. Mr, Dewitt wanted to reclaim
1
ne property and I told Mr. Crabtree it was out of the
_, 4Ucstion. I told Mr. Dewitt that in English.
3
4

5

MR. GUZMAN: Ms. Petersen, do y o u h a w .inv

questions at this time?

6

MS. PETERSEN: I do. T h a n k s .

7
8

4

EXAMINATION BY

Paa- ^0
\pproximatei\ -- 1 started mo•

M.:

s;iu wAcn CAC you finish movmj '
1 iui\en'!
K

. nu ha\e not yet?

A I'\e lived :n the house for 25 years and I

im still moving out of it.
Q When did you have yoi lr phone disconnected at
i lie ()rem address'?

13
14

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

A About three weeks ago.

10

Q Thank you. You mentioned some children that

II

may or may not have been around at the home to answer

12

the phone.

13

A Which home?

15
Q In Salt Lake. Could you tell nu
16
A There's only one there and his name is
17 James.
18
Q I understand that.
19
A And he's still a child.
20
Q How old is he 0
A He's about 17.
Q Do you have sons and daughters-I
visit you?
A Very seldom.
Q Do they live in the area?

Page 29 - Page 32

And did they ever visa you when you lived

A Periodically.

25

i\Ci\

..ne three that live in the area.
v

. n the < u-em home?

9
Q Just for clarification, because we've talked
j 9
10 about several things and I don't think we've fleshed outj 10
11 some details here, so if you feel like I'm repeating I
j
12 apologize, but I would just like to have things as clear 12
13 as possible. When we asked you about your address at 13
14 the beginning of the deposition, you gave it as a Salt
-i
15 Lake City address. It's my understanding that at the
- time these events took place you lived in Orem; is *hat
correct
. is
.>
.A At the time what events took place?
19
Q At the time the foreclosures began, flic
; *•
20 notice of sale and the negotiations with Mr. Dewitt took 2i
place.
.;:
\ 1 was basically semi-living in Salt Lake at
^
: * the time the foreclosures were going on. as I recall.
2/
Q When did vou move to Salt Lake ' M a \ \ mat
«
vx ill

. Do ihcy . w :i ine area?
Q Do they live in the area?

j

8

14
15
16
17
18
19
2(

VJ1V55C

Page 3

6
j 7

MS. PETERSEN:

1.

Q Could any of them have been vi.Mtimj on
approximately February 5th of 1996?
A I have no idea. I doubt it.
g

v\ here do they live in the area? Do they

r in town, do they live out of the way ~
A I have three sons that live in Salt Lake.
Q Thank you. At the time you lived in the
Orem home there was still only this young son James that
could have been at the home to be answering the
telephone?
\ As far as I know;
Q Okay. We discussed a little bit about the
agreement that you had with Mr. Dewitt and you -A The verbal agreement?
Q -\nu vou began to talk about the verbal
agj-^ment and I kind of got sidetracked. I would just
like to have you explain to us what your understanding
of the verbal agreement was at the time you made the
agreement. Notwithstanding what you think you found out

Page 32
later, what was your agreement that you made with him
over the phone?
A When I got his phone call, he suggested that
he takeover, as I recall, the payments that were due and
pay it up. And he didn't have enough money at the time
to pay it all up and he wanted some extra time, he
wanted two weeks extra. He said he would give me a
thousand down and he would hand deliver it, as I recall,
and try and make amends for what had been done and make
up for the defaults and the problems that had occurred.
And then I think right after I got that check I found
out through Mr. Crabtree, and other sources, that the
property had been mortgaged without my permission and
taxes had not been paid as they had said they were ant1
there was no fire insurance and the quit claim deed had
already transferred the property to him without my
knowledge.
Q You did agree to accept the S1,00U
A Except I didn't know what had transpired and
1 did not cash that check.
Q I understand that.
MS. PETERSEN: could you just instruct him
•iswer the question?
rHE WITNESS: I agreed verbally.
MR cuNEt At this time did your
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Earl L. Grosscn

l understanding of this agreement include anything else?
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
is

Did it include something with respect to the taxes, the
insurance?
THE WITNESS: As I recall, the taxes had not
been paid, the fire insurance had not been obtained, and
I forget the details of that, but I recall that I was
very irritated that there was two years of back taxes
due and there was no fire insurance on the property. If
it burned down, I would be left holding the bag.
Q (By Ms. Petersen) Mr. Grossen, my question
is when you made the verbal agreement, did you discuss
back taxes at that time with Mr. Dewitt?
A I don't remember.
Q Okay. Your first testimony was that you
didn't know about the back taxes at the time of the
agreement and that it was a surprise after the
agreement. Is it my understanding now that your
testimony is that you don't remember at the time you
made the conversation whether or not you discussed the
back taxes?
A Well, it seems like I had been aware that
those back taxes hadn't been paid before I talked to
him, but I think we - we did talk about it, but I'm not
real sure.
Q Okay, thank you.

A It was in March, I think.
Q Thank you.
lis
A I don't remember the exact date.
19
Q After you spoke with Mr. Dewitt on the
20 phone, did you have contact with Mr. Crabtree, who I
21
understand was your attorney at the time; is that
2*>
correct?
23
A Say again.
24
Q Was Mr. Crabtree your attorney at the time
25

thatyou spoke with Mr. Dewitt on the phone and made the
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

verbal agreement?
A Yes, I believe he was.
Q Did you speak with Mr. Crabtree about that
conversation and inform him that you had made an
agreement of some sort?
A I told him that I had made a verbal
agreement with Mr. Dewitt and the deal was off and I was
not going to cash the checks.
Q Did you ever contact Mr. Dewitt prior to the
notice of sale being posted to inform him of that?
A I didn't, but he called my attorney about

12

it.

13
Q Let me just make sure I'm clear. Your
14 instructions -- you had a telephone conversation with
15 Mr. Dewitt, you made a verbal agreement, at what
16 point - how many days, hours, weeks after you made that
17 verbal agreement did you decide that the deal was off?
18
A I think within a couple of days. Soon
19 enough that I didn't cash the check.
20
Q So you called Mr. Crabtree. Did you call
21 him first and tell him that you had made an agreement?
22
A No, I think Mr. Dewitt called him and then
23 Mr. Crabtree called me, as I recall, back. I can't
24 remember for sure.
25
Q Okay. So you never told Mr. Crabtree —
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A I'm going by memory.
Q Thank you, that's all I had on that.
A And it's been a long time ago.
Q The next question I have is you testified
that you were surprised by the Transamerica lien. I
would like to ask you to the best of your recollection
did you know about the Transamerica lien when you spoke
with Mr. Dewitt over the phone and made the agreement?
A I don't think I did.
Q Thank you. When did you find out, to the
best of your recollection, about the Transamerica lien?
A As I recall it was in March when they called
me.
Q Okay. And when was the notice of sale
again0

TM
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

what check are you referring to about?
A The first check he gave me for a thousand.
As I recall, that was the amount.
Q And just so I'm clear on the time line,
approximately what day did you speak to him on the phone
and make the agreement?
A It seems like it was the first part of
February.
Q And how soon after that conversation did he
bring you the check?
A The second check?
Q The first check, the SI,000 that he promised
on the phone.
A I think it was within 24 hours. I don't
recall for sure.
Q So you think it was within 24 hours and you
hadn't A Of the conversation?
Q Yes.
A It seems like it was. It seems like he was
rather anxious to pay me the thousand. And I think he
hand delivered it, as I said.
Q And you had not contacted Mr. Crabtree at
the time that you accepted the first $1,000 check?
A That I don't recall.
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' 1

Q How long after that phone conversation did
/ou accept the second check for $617?
^ For how much?
4
\) f> 1", if m\ recollection is correct.
5
\ ! thought it was 1,600, but it could haw
6 been 600. I think it was about two weeks later, (• \
7 days later that he got the second check to me.
8
Q And you had already spoken ~ had you
9 already spoken to Mr. Crabtree and said the deal was off
-•. then' 7

!

\ Yes. Yes.
fj And why uui

M-

; •-• '

A Y\ hy did I accept it? I wasn't there to
receive it. He put it in my mailbox.
Q Had he delivered checks that way before?
\ ! Jidn't get it in person. Pardon?
Q Had he delivered checked to you before?
19
A Had he delivered them?
20
Q Had there been checks delivered that way to
\ou before through the mailbox slot?
A I believe I said that some of the checks had
..,} been delivered by Kevin Dewitt by way of my mailbox
I-* without postage on them.
Is
Q Had you spoken to Mr. Dewitt prior to the

i
:
3
4
5
b
"
8
9
10
1
1
.
•

."

..
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
io
l
;2
4
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vcond check being delivered and let him know that the
deal was off?
A No, I don' t believe 1 did.
Q So when he delivered the second check he was
still not informed that you had changed your mind?
MR. CLIXE: Objection I don't want you
speculating as to what he knew or didn't know at that
time
Q (By Ms. Petersen) As far as \iMr. Grossen, did he know''
A To tell you the truth. I realK den * rcca..
whether I talked to him —
\ ••- prior ID that second check arriving.
Q Okay, thank you
MS. PETERSEN. I believe that's all the
questions I have at this time.
MR. Gl'ZMAX: I have one more.
FI :RTHER EXAMINATION

.:•

•":•••

MR.

GUZMAN:

-l„
23
24
25

Q Regarding the S1,000 check that was
delivered in person, at that time when you accepted that
check, was it your intent - am I to understand it was
your intent at that point in time to honor the agreement
that you had with Mr. Dewitt and then subsequent to that
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.i
21
22
225

•*jn.%*&&%'

Page 3 (
\ou found -- you ukwovcrcu iiuug> that you — that were
disturbing to you and then that's when you decided that
you did not want to go through with the deal, as you
testified earlier?
A Well, as I said, it was never a written
agreement, it was a verbal agreement. He gave me a
check for 51,000, and as I recall he agreed to make the
payments current which were in default and to pay the
late payments which were due on those defaulted
payments.
Q I understand that.
A What's your question?
Q My question is was it your intent at the
time that you received the check in person from -- th*
$1,000 from Mr. Dewitt, to honor the agreement, the :c:.
that you referred to earlier?
A 1 think that there was a verbal agreement to
AV cept his check at the time.
Q My question was, was it your intent to honor
the agreement when you accepted that check?
A I just said I think there was a verbal
agreement -Q The $ 1 , 0 0 0 A - to allow that check to r> »••
'e
payment for the back payments.
Page 40

Q And I understand that, but my question goes
to your intent and —
MR. CLiNE: whatever the agreement was, did
you intend to honor the agreement at the time that you
entered into it? Was it your intent ~
Q (By Mr. Guzman) At the time that you
accepted the 5 1 , 0 0 0 MR. CLINE: -- on the phone THE WITNESS: To tell you the truth, 1 was
really skeptical, as I think back on it, because he came
in a flash with the check and was gone in a flash and
there was really never any long conversation about any
lengthy agreement, verbal or otherwise. And I just
recall he was short money and he couldn' t pay the rest
of the money and he wanted me to wait, I agreed to
wait. So I suspect there was some intent there because
I took his check, but I didn't eu>n it necause of what I
learned after the fact.
Q (By Mr. Guzman, ^ me astc you, would you
19
20 think it unusual if you had -- >ou were Mr. Ogden
f
21 Dewitt, not Kevin, but :: Mr Ogden Dewitt s situation,
where someone in your family was going to lose their
home,
if you had made an agreement to cure the default,
23
24 would you think that - would you think that out of the
25 ordinary that the person would come quickly to the - to
"}"»

I
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1

before February 29th?

2

you and pay that money?
A Would I think in the same way? I don't

3
4

know, I've never been in that circumstance.
Q You just said that you thought that it was

4

perhaps March or April, so it wouldn't have been March

5

funny that he came in a flash, but do you now think this

5

or April, it would have been before February 29th?

1

6
7
8
9
10

13
14

A Yes.

3

Q And you had said that you couldn't recall,

was a situation that called for the quickest of actions

6

A Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes, that is correct.

on Mr. Dewitt's A I've never been in that circumstances, I

7

Q I'm going to also refresh your recollection

8

by asking you to ~ this is the Notice of Default that's

don't know what I would do.
Q So you don't know that you would pay it that

9

filed with the Utah County Recorder's Office on the

111 quickly?
12

2

A I think it would depend on the
circumstances.
Q And I understand from your testimony, then,

10

property. The three items of default that are listed

n

there, if I could just have you read those three items

12

as to why the Notice of Default was filed.

13
14

1,132 as of September 12th, 1995, taxes and assessments

A Principal and interest in the amount of

15

that you did have an intent to honor this agreement when

15

levied on the property, accounts necessary to maintain

16
17

you accepted that S 1,000 check from Mr. Ogden Dewitt?

16

adequate fire insurance and improvements on the trust

A First of ail, I didn't cash the check and -

17

property. And this was -

Q I understand. You said accepted ~

18

18
19
20

A There was some kind of an agreement
obviously because I accepted the check.

Q What's the date on that?

19

A 19th day of September, 1995.

20

Q To the best of your knowledge, were the

21

Q My question was accepted -

21

property taxes ever brought current prior to the

22

A But I didn't cash it.

22

trustee's sale?

23
24
25

MR. CLINE: That's asked and answered. He's

23
24

answered that.
MR. GUZMAN': Do you have any more

A No, they weren't because I paid them, two
years.

25

Q To the best of your knowledge, was the

Page 42
1

questions?
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1

insurance ever placed in effect prior to the trustee's

2

MS. PETERSEN: Not at this time.

2

sale?

3

MR. GUZMAN: Perhaps we could take a break.

4

MR. CLINE: I have some.

3
4

insurance on that house for sure. And to my knowledge

>
6

MR. GUZMAN: Would you like to ask him some
questions? I'm sorry, go ahead.

7
8
C)

EXAMINATION
BY MR. CLINE.

Q Let me go through some questions that I have

K)

A I only remember one time when they had

5
6

there was no other insurance.
Q Between the time that this was signed,

7

September 19th, 1996, and the date of the trustee's

8

sale —
A There was no insurance.

9

for you and then we'll go ahead and take our break. In
i 1 order to refresh your recollection, this is a copy of
i : the trustee deed that was recorded with the County. Can
13 you read here the date that the trustee's sale was held?
14
A February 29th.

10

15

Q Right.

In

A Okay.

16

I've read. Read that out loud, if you would.

Q Does that refresh your recollection as to

17

r
IS
19

20
21

when the trustee's sale was held?
A Yes, seeing it in print.
Q Yes.

11

Q ~ to the best of your knowledge - okay.
And I'm going to show you, to refresh your recollection.

12

trust deed that's recorded with the Utah County

13

Recorder's Office, I don't - it's paragraph 11. I

14

don't know if you are able to read that. It's - if you

,15

can't, I will read it for you and you can confirm what
A Should trustor sale, convey, transfer or
dispose or further encumber said property or any part

18
19

thereof without the written consent of the beneficiary

20

being first had and obtained, then beneficiary shall

21

have the right at the option to declare all sums thereby

process of getting remarried and trying to get my house

22

forthwith due and payable.

23
24

cleared out. I couldn't remember all of the dates.

Q To the best of your knowledge did, in fact,
23
24 1 the Dewitts encumber the property without your written

[25

then, would those have taken place before October - or

1 ">">

A This was a chaotic time because I was in the

Q The conversations that you've talked about,
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Page 491

Page ? 1
} ill, GUZMAN; Back on the record.
Q (By Mr. Guzman) Mr. Grossen, regarding the
quit claim that you referred to as in violation of the
contract, do you know from whom • ^ r ,>m a K »h-

mailbox before?
f
K I don t recall. I know Kevin Dewitt had and
his wife had, his former wife or whoever she was. I

16
,7 '
18
19

don't recall.
MR. CLINE: No further questions.
FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. 01 JZMAN:
Q While Ms. Petersen is looking at the trust
deed note, just going back to the last question, when
j IC - when your attorney asked if you believed that
Mr. Ogden Dewitt received fair notice that the deal was
off what would you consider fair notice to be?
\ Now wait a minute. Repeat that.
\ iii were just asked if you felt that
Mr. Ogden Dewitt had received fair notice that the deal
was off —
T H E WITNESS: No, I thought you were talking
about the trustee's sale, the sheriff's sale. I thought
that's what you were talking about.
MR. GUZMAN: I'm sorry, what w as you i
question?
FHE WITNESS: Isn't that what we were
talking about?
MR. GUZMAN: Perhaps I misunderstood it.
MR. CLINE: whatever the agreement was that

^ ^ i recall -- Dave Crab tree told me about
it and as I recall, like I said, it was after I got his
N
• S1,000 check from the verbal agreement, it was from
* Afton to Ogden.
\ ,; you sure about 11
ITiat's my recollection.
12
Are you sure about that?
^ I'm not real sure. It could have been Kevin
= i^w\
\ i know is I was upset at the time because
15 the property had been transferred without my consent and
16 in violation of the contract.
:'
\>>
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
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13
!4

in

I"*
IS

you had with - when you called —
THE WITNESS: The verbal agreement MR. CLINE: You had the $1,000 check THE WITNESS: what about the agreement?
MR. CLINE: You tore up the check and the
question is did, in your opinion, did Ogden Dewitt,
ifter you tore up that check and said we're going to go
ihead with the notice of the trustee's sale and hold the
trustee's sale, did Ogden Dewitt have fair notice that
the trustee's sale was going forward?
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sure he did. Yeah, he
called my attorney, David Crabtree.
Q (By Mr. Guzman) And my question then to you
would be what would you consider fair notice to be, one
day, two days, two weeks, one month'7
A Any and all of the above.
MR. GUZMAN. Do you have any questions for
him?

I*}

20

MS. PETERSEN: N o t r i g h t now,,,

MR. GUZMAN. Then perhaps it would be a good
o take a break. I would like to discuss a few
things with my client.
MR. CLINE: okay, let's go off the record,
(Off-the-record discussion.)
__
(A brief recess.)
!lnic [
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MR. G U Z M A N : D o y o u h . i U '

i i n p \ nl IJ it i.|un

aai::..
MR CLINE: I d o n ' t ,

MR. GUZMAN: I'm sorry, I don't.
Q (By Mr. Guzman) It's my understanding that
the quit claim is from Afton to Kevin. Afton and Kevin,
were they both the parties to the contract?
A They signed the promissory - or the -Q I'm sorry, the deed -- the trust Pa^e 52

i
2
1

-

s
9
10
\\
i:
;;
:-i
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

i he 'rust deed. yes.
^< Are : he\ the only persons named on that
'rust deed '
A Yes. Ogden i ^vto >.nnx ivu t^
picture until recently.
So ._: \rton j u : claimed her interest in :he
pro pert \ to Keun, she would still be hanle under the
trust deed note'*
A She is liable because she signed.
Q So in this case all we have is one party to
"he contract quitclaiming the property to the other'.'
MR. CLINE: well, you're assuming facts not
^eiorc us. You can make that argument to the court if
:hat's the case.
Q (By Mr, Guzman) Under the contract, as was
quoted, it says that you would demand all sums due and
payable under the contract if, from what t understand,
if there was an encumbrance on the property; is that not
correct'7 Is that not the language of the contract?
MR. CLINE: The language speaks for itself,
but that's the general -Q (By Mr. Guzman) Did you ever make a demanc i
for all the sums due and payable under the contract to
Afton or Kevin Dewitt?
A On several occasions I thought about it.
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Q Under this provision of the contract,
regarding the encumbrance of the property, did you ever
make a demand for all sums due and payable under the
contract pursuant to that provision of the contract once
you became aware —
A I thought about it and I didn't pursue it at
the time.
MR. GUZMAN: Ms. Petersen?
FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MS. PETERSEN:
Q I would just like to bring your attention
back to the telephone conversation between you and
Mr. Dewitt. At the time the verbal agreement was made,
do you recall how the arrangements came about of who
determined ~ did you inform Mr. Dewitt of the amount of
arrearages owing?
A I believe that I came up with the total.
Q And how did you calculate that total?
A On the basis of what was owed. Payments
that hadn' t been paid.
Q And how much were the regular monthly
payments, do you recall?
A Well, they varied. Some months it was 300
and on other months it was 252, on other occasions it
was approximately 265. It varied from month to month.

'

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Page
don't know.
Q So it's your testimony then that Mr. Ogden
Dewitt didn't call you and offer you $1,000 for you to
hold off, but rather you told him the exact amount of
what the arrearages were?
A He didn't know what was owing. I told him
what was owing and he told me he couldn't paid pay it at
the time.
MS. PETERSEN: That's all that I have at
this time.
FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. CLINE:
Q Do you recall when this conversation took
place regarding the amounts that would —
A I'm sure he does.
Q What's your recollection?
A My recollection is it was in February or the
latter part of January.
Q How long after that did he bring down the
check for SI,000?
A How long after the conversation?
Q Right.
A It was fairly soon.
Q Same day?
A It seems like it was the same day, but I
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could be wrong on that.
Q How long after that did you talk to David
Crabtree?
A I think within the next 24 hours.
Q AndA And I was very upset because things were not
right.
Q And so when did you decide to go forward
with the foreclosure?
A Immediately. I told Dave that I was not
going to go through with the verbal agreement that we
had made over the phone because of the facts that had
been named.
Q Prior to the trustee's sale, did you ever
talk to Ogden Dewitt on the telephone?
A Prior to that, uh-huh (affirmative).
Q And what did you tell Ogden Dewitt?
A Prior to the trustee's sale?
Q Right. And after you had decided to go
forward with the trustee's sale.
A I had tentatively agreed verbally to allow
him to make part of the payments in the two installments
basically.
Q Right. This is after that tentative
agreement. You had that tentative agreement, same day
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Q The terms of the contract varied, or their
payments varied?
A The terms of the payments. The amount of
payments that were made. The dollar amounts changed
from month to month because of late payments and because
for some reason there were months when they wanted to
pay 300 a month.
Q Okay. And were they paid -A But the majority of the months were the
agreed on amount of 252 plus the late payment.
Q And when they paid S300 a month, where was
that extra money going to? Was it going to —
A To the payment.
Q To the principal?
A Principal and interest.
Q And you calculated that into your figures
when you gave him the arrearage amount?
A Yes.
Q And how many months did you calculate were
in arrears when Kevin was ~ at the time of the phone
call with Ogden?
A The amount of the two checks. Whatever the
amount was. I think the one check was a thousand and I
forget the exact total of the other one. It was either
600 and something or 1600. I tore the checks up so I
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